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Abstract  
Does democracy cause higher economic growth?  We build a model taking culture and 
interpersonal cooperation into account and find that democracy increases economic 
productivity through giving people more equal rights, which allows people to build a larger 
interpersonal network so that they can reduce investment risk and employ high-productivity 
(high-risk) methods in production.  
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1. Introduction 
Economists have for a long time been aware of the influence of democracy on economic 
development. But theoretical and empirical studies on this topic are largely inconclusive. 
Some economists think that democracy may harm economic development. They argue that 
democracy increases demand for redistribution and increases current consumption that 
consequently reduces investment and does harm to economic growth Huntington (1968); 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991). Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), however, stress that redistribution 
and democratization of a society do not necessarily have adverse effects on growth, as 
redistribution may increase the level of human capital of the poor. 
  
As well as the theoretical conflicts, most of the empirical studies find ambiguous impacts of 
democracy on growth. According to a review of 16 empirical studies on the association 
between democracy and growth reported by Borner and Weder (1995), three studies uncover 
a positive relation, three negative relation and the remaining ten are inconclusive. Although 
recent empirical studies employ more advanced econometric tools, there has not been a 
definite conclusion. (Please see Aghion & Howitt (2009) for a review of the recent empirical 
literature.) 
 
We therefore try to re-study this topic from a new perspective, which takes culture and 
interpersonal cooperation into account. We establish a model to show that democracy 
increases economic productivity through giving people more freedom, which allows them to 
build a larger social network to reduce investment risk so that they are willing to take 
high-productivity ways in production.  
 
2. Theory 
 
2.1 Cultural Gap and Cooperation 
In a society, there are some different cultural groups
1
. Each individual  has a cultural 
orientation denoted by  with . Following Gradstein and Justman (2001), we 
assume no cultural gap between members in each group. Cultural gap is denoted by  and 
, where i and j are different individuals.  
 
Cultural gap is related to economic activities in two aspects. The first is that it influences the 
possibility of cooperation. We use  to represent the possibility of a successful cooperation, 
and assume  with , which means that for any two individuals, the 
possibility of a successful transaction decreases as the cultural gap increases. In addition, 
 and . 
 
The second aspect is that cultural gap has a relation with the potential benefit of cooperation. 
The potential benefit is denoted by , and it is assumed that , . We may 
consider  as the return rate of investment or economic productivity. If we understand  as 
economic productivity, then when an agent invests capital , she obtains , where  is a 
parameter reflecting scale economy. This assumption could be understood from the 
perspective of social networks, especially with the knowledge of structural holes. A structural 
hole is a void in a social structure, and in terms of social networks refers to an absence of 
                                                          
1
 We may understand cultural groups as the elites and citizens.  
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connections between groups (Jackson, 2008). According to Burt (2001), if an individual is 
able to fill structural holes, he may end up with power and control over the flow of 
information and bring favors between groups. It implies that the potential benefit of 
cooperation between people with different cultural backgrounds may be substantial.  
 
2.2 Democracy and Economic Productivity 
We use a variable  to denote the level of democracy with , where  
represents the most democratic institutions and  is the worst situation. Democracy 
influences the interpersonal communication between members of different cultural groups. 
For example, in a democratic country people enjoy more freedom and more equal rights. The 
elites cannot isolate themselves from the citizens because, for instance, they have to share 
public facilities with citizens. On the other hand, a nondemocratic country is characterized by 
more controls over citizens and less communication between the elites and citizens.
2
 
 
A person encounters a large number of people and tries to cooperate with them to produce a 
common output . The number of people with the same cultural orientation is . The 
productivity of cooperating with those people is  with probability of 1, so risk is 0. The 
number of encounters with different cultural orientation is .  is related to the level of 
democracy and it is assumed that , where  is the upper bound of . This 
assumption is based on the understanding that, democracy, at the very least, includes equal 
rights under the law, such as freedom of speech and assembly, equal access to social goods 
and services. Democracy also includes equal rights in the economic sense, such as equal 
access to education, health care and other social securities. Because in a democratic political 
regime people from different classes have to enjoy social goods and services equally, they 
have more chance to communicate with each other. By contrast, in a less democratic country, 
the elites often control important resources and isolate themselves from the citizens who are 
less privileged. As a result, it is less likely for people from different classes to make good 
communication in such an unequal society.  
 
A perspective explaining why the elites in an undemocratic political regime tend to isolate 
themselves from the citizens is from the perspective of public services. Democratic states 
earn fewer monopoly rents and produce a higher level of services than autocracies. It means 
that in an undemocratic society, the elites, who control the government, tend to provide less 
public service, while in a democratic society the government would supply much more public 
services. As a result of limited supply of public services, the elites have to compete with 
citizens in obtaining those services in an undemocratic society. Unsurprisingly, the simplest 
way is to isolate themselves from the citizens and announce the access to some public 
services as privileges of the elites. On the contrary, a democratic society is characterized by 
more public services than its undemocratic counterparts. The elites, therefore, do not need to 
establish many privileges so as to isolate themselves from the citizens. The result of less 
competition between elites and the citizens is more possible cooperation and communication 
between them.  
 
The productivity of cooperating with them is  with the probability of  and risk of 
 (  is the variance of productivity that equals to  ).  
                                                          
2
 That is what happened in China. A vivid illustration is China’s Household Registration System. An extreme 
example is the slavery institution.  
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Agent  invest capital  for the production and gains , where  is the expected 
productivity.  All agents are risk averse with the utility function , where  and 
 are expected productivity and risk of the investment portfolio.  
 
 and  are respectively proportions of capital invested in the cooperation with people of 
the same or different cultural groups, where . The agent divides  into  
parts and divides  capital into  parts. So the risk of the production portfolio is 
. 
The utility maximization problem of agent  is described below.  
 
 
 
;   
It is not difficult to show that the optimal productivity  is related to the level of democracy, 
 and . Therefore the expected output of the agent is  . 
Through the process of proof, we can conclude that democracy increases economic 
productivity through giving people more freedom so that they can build a larger interpersonal 
network and reduce investment risk.  
Proposition1: The optimal productivity is a positive function of democracy level, namely 
 and . 
Proof: Since ,  can be written as  . 
Since  is independent and always bounded, we can transform the constraints 
into , where  and . So the 
maximization problem becomes . The first order condition is 
. We have , which implies a 
monotone positive relationship between  and , because , ,  
and . Therefore   and .  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 Data and Methods 
We are going to test the argument that democracy increases economic productivity. We 
employ the method of Solow residual to calculate productivity. Production function is written 
as  so that , where  is 
the total output,  is physical capital,  is human capital,  is population and  is 
productivity. After estimating productivity, we analyze the influence of democracy on it. In 
4
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the econometric model,  are control variables,  and  are country and time indicators 
respectively. In order to deal with endogenous problem, we adopt the suggestion of Heid et al. 
(2012) to employ system-GMM estimation, which is contributed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), since system-GMM performs well with highly persistent 
data under mild assumptions.  
 
 
An unbalanced panel with five-year interval from 1960 to 2000 is employed, which is taken 
from Acemoglu et al. (2008). There are two different measures for democracy: the Freedom 
House index and the composite Polity IV index, both of which range from 0 to 1, with 1 
representing the most democratic political institution. We use the Freedom House index as 
our main measure of democracy because of its broad coverage of countries and use Polity IV 
index for comparison.  
 
3.2 Empirical Results 
We can find that democracy increases economic productivity. The results imply that if 
democracy level increases by 1, economic productivity may increase 0.05 percent at most. 
Although the temporary economic effect is not very large, the long-run effect (cumulative 
effect) may be substantial. All of the estimations show that democracy has significant 
influence on productivity. Therefore, we are able to conclude that our theoretical analysis is 
credible.  
 
Table1. Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable is  
Freedom House Index  Polity IV 
 OLS Sys-GMM Sys-GMM   OLS Sys-GMM Sys-GMM 
 
 0.97** 1.02** 1.05**  0.97** 1.04** 1.02** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) 
 
 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.004***  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Control  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Observations  547 547 534  502 502 502 
*, ** and ***denotes the significance at the 10, 5 and 1percent level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS 
and sys-GMM are ordinary least squares estimation and system GMM estimation. I use proportion of the middle age as 
control variable.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper basically completes the analysis of the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth. In order to make clear whether democracy causes higher economic growth, 
we build a model taking culture and cooperation into consideration. Through our empirical 
analysis we find that Polity IV is more effective than Freedom House Index as the 
consideration factor. We show that democracy allows people to build a larger interpersonal 
network so as to reduce investment risk. As a result, they tend to use high-productivity (high 
risk) methods in production.  
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